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ABSTRACT 
In the discovery portion of court proceedings, it is necessary to produce information to opposing 
counsel. Traditionally, this information is in paper form with all privileged information removed. 
Increasingly, the information requested during discovery exists in digital form and savvy counsel is 
requesting direct access to the original digital source: a broad spectrum of additional digital 
information can be often be extracted using digital forensics. This paper describes the major problems 
which must be solved to redact digital information from electronic devices.  The primary hurdle facing 
digital redaction is the lack of a rational process for systematically handling encoded, encrypted, or 
otherwise complex data objects. Any such process would need to incorporate a method for validating 
the integrity of electronic or digital redaction processes. 
Keywords: digital forensics, redaction, electronic discovery, legal production, privilege 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Redaction is the process of removing privileged information from a document or set of documents 
before its presentation to other parties. The reasons for redaction are many and varied [1,7,9,10,11]. 
This paper will focus on those that apply to the legal community, because the rules of conduct for 
redaction in the legal system are the most defined and constraining. 
During the discovery portion of court proceedings, it is necessary to produce information to opposing 
counsel. In general, a lawyer's work on a case is protected by the work-product privilege, 
communications are protected between an attorney and their client, and other parties have no right to 
this information. The work-product privilege means that any documents prepared in anticipation of 
litigation or for trial by a party's representative enjoy a qualified immunity from discovery. Other such 
privileges include: doctor/patient, priest/penitent, and husband/wife. To prove to the court that 
information is privileged, the party claiming privilege must show that the communication: 1) was 
made with an expectation of confidentiality, 2) is essential to a socially approved relationship or 
purpose, and 3) has not been waived by disclosure of the contents of the communications to persons 
outside of the relationship. 
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The result of redaction is the production of three pieces of information: an In Camera Copy of the 
privileged information, a Privilege Log and a Redacted Production Copy of the information. The In 
Camera copy contains all the items regarded as privileged and is presented to the judge in the case. 
The Privilege Log and Redacted Production Copy are presented to opposing counsel. If a question 
arises as to whether a particular item on the privilege log actually meets the burden of privilege, the 
judge can review the material within the In Camera copy and provide judgment. 
Traditionally, the requested information is presented in paper form. Currently, two methods are used 
to redact paper documents – “blackout” and physical removal. The blackout method involves using a 
black marker to conceal portions of a document that are considered privileged.   The physical removal 
method involves selecting documents from a group of papers and removing them from the set. 
Depending on the court’s requirements, this may necessitate marking the exact location from which 
the document was removed. 
The same set of concerns exist for privileged information residing on electronic storage devices, but 
no standard method of digital redaction has been adopted by the legal community.  Computerized 
methods that mimic the blackout process exist, as do those for mimicking the physical removal 
method [3,5].  The latter typically involves the collection of all readable documents from a computer, 
placing them in a collection, and selecting the items to redact.  Yet, while electronic blackout and 
removal methods can sanitize a document or set of documents found on an electronic device, they do 
nothing to redact logical copies or copied fragments of the document that remain.  
Moreover, with the introduction of digital forensics and digital evidence into the court system, it is 
becoming necessary to produce the entire contents of computer disks and other electronic storage 
devices as evidence. This production goes beyond simply selecting all readable documents on a drive. 
It involves producing information that exists in free or slack space, deleted items, document fragments 
and even data that may not be in a readily identifiable format. This collection process produces what is 
commonly referred to as a forensics copy. 
The growing numbers of electronic devices that integrate digital data storage components have 
exacerbated the issue of redaction.  Devices such as cell phones, digital cameras, and digital music 
players, along with laptops and desktop computers store information using a variety of file systems, 
media technologies, and data formats. The sheer variety of these storage possibilities differentiates this 
issue from the traditional methods of redaction and the physical pen-and-paper form they take.   
Highlighting this issue is the fact that a single data fragment may be physically replicated multiple 
times on media.  Moreover, simply deleting a file does not usually mean the information is actually 
erased, but only that the reference point is destroyed.  A faithful redaction process for data storage 
images must account for these subtleties in a systematic and comprehensive manner. 
2. DIGITAL REDACTION CHALLENGES 
The challenges to digital redaction are numerous and substantial [2,3,6,8].  They include: 
? The variety and disparities in electronic storage devices 
? The potential for encrypted data 
? Files which are deleted but recoverable in slack space or unoccupied regions of a file system 
? Data fragmentation 
? Isolation of privilege by context for integrated data 
To completely redact digital information from an electronic device, it is critical to determine all logical 
and physical locations of pertinent documents and related data fragments that reside on the digital 
media.  This is because data is routinely stored in multiple locations on most devices. For example, 
Microsoft Word files are normally saved in a user-selected directory, but may also be automatically 
backed-up in a temporary folder as a part of normal operation; therefore, a Word document would 
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logically exist at least twice on the computer system. 
Similarly, deleting privileged information from digital media does not fully protect it from a well-
executed forensic examination. The only versions of a document that can be directly deleted are listed 
in file mapping tables. Other copies of the item, i.e. those that remain in slack space, might be located 
during a thorough digital forensic examination.  
Determining all of the physical locations of digital information is also important due to the partitioning 
methods of electronic media and devices. For example, consider the effect of a user creating a file on a 
LINUX system and subsequently saving it on a FAT partition of the hard drive. The drive is then 
repartitioned and the file falls out of the new logical partition size, the file is moved into the space on 
the hard drive reserved for that resized FAT partition. Thus, the file may now exist at least twice on 
the hard drive; once in the new location and once in its original location.  
In determining whether information is privileged, one must be able to interpret the information 
rationally; if information is unreadable, privilege cannot be determined. This presents a problem on 
digital devices when information is stored encoded, protected or encrypted. During the redaction 
process, digital data without rational interpretation may be produced on the grounds that it contains no 
apparent privilege.  The data may actually contain privileged information that is concealed by the 
encoding.   Consequently, if a rational interpretation is later discovered the data can be decoded. This 
scenario admits the possibility of the privileged information being unknowingly (and unfortunately) 
revealed to opposing counsel. 
Finally, the accuracy of the digital redaction process is extremely important. In producing a redacted 
copy, care should be taken to demonstrate that the integrity of the redacted copy is preserved as it 
relates to the source media. The redaction process should only remove the data segments marked for 
redaction and leave all remaining segments untouched.  Thus, digital redaction methods should 
incorporate validation schemes that offer assurance regarding the integrity of the redaction process. 
3. DIGITAL REDACTION COMPONENTS 
There are several components required to perform the digital redaction process.  The first component 
is identifying Privileged Information.  Next, an Electronic Device Investigation is performed on a 
Work Copy of an Electronic device.  The result of this investigation will identify privileged 
information, complex and indeterminate data objects and produce an index of redactable items.  
Finally, the Digital Redaction Process uses Redaction Tokens to produce both a Redacted Production 
Copy with an associated Privilege Log and an In Camera Copy of the information.  The Redacted 
Production Copy is then re-processed to provide reasonable certainty as to accuracy of the redaction 
and the In Camera copy is validated through a digital redaction assurance process.  These components 
are unique to the Digital Redaction Process and are detailed below. 
3.1 Privileged Information 
Electronic redaction allows for the selective exclusion of information protected under privilege as 
defined by federal, state, and local laws; e.g. attorney-client, doctor-patient, priest-penitent, marital, 
etc.  
The selection of privileged content is based on the current legal standards for such material. These 
standards involve communication between an accepted member of an accepted privilege class acting 
in an accepted capacity. Additionally, the court may indicate that certain topics are off-limits and any 
such related material is to be redacted as well. 
3.2 Electronic Device Investigation 
The process of redaction typically begins with the creation and/or selection of a Work Copy of an 
Electronic Device.  A Work Copy is typically a forensics copy of the original media, but could be the 
original media where it is impractical or impossible to create such a copy.  A Digital Forensic 
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Investigation is then performed in order to find all privileged digital information qualifying for 
redaction, including complex and indeterminate data (described later). This yields an index of 
redactable items each with a description of their reason for redaction. 
3.3 Complex and Indeterminate Data Objects 
A digital forensics investigation can yield privileged and non-privileged information.  In addition, it 
may uncover data that is not immediately interpretable.  Such data may be structured, compressed or 
otherwise encoded for interpretation by a special application or method, e.g. an Outlook PST file for 
an e-mail application.  Encryption, data scrambling, or fragmentation may also prevent immediate 
interpretation of data.  Any data that is encoded or structured (and interpretable by a special viewer or 
application) is treated as a Complex Data Object.   
A metaphorical example of a Complex Data Object is a piece of used carbon paper: if carbon paper is 
used multiple times, it may contain interwoven and overlapping documents which cannot be easily 
interpreted. At this point, it is unclear if the carbon paper contains privileged information; however, 
analysis could yield the individual documents which may contain privileged information. Clearly it 
would be irresponsible to produce this carbon paper without performing this analysis and redacting the 
privileged information. 
Complex Data Objects are subject to an additional investigative process using appropriate tools and 
techniques to interpret the data and make it readable. The interpreted data can then be subject to digital 
redaction.  In cases where no interpretation method is available, such data are labeled Indeterminate 
Data Objects, and may be redacted until a method for interpretation presents itself in the future (and as 
a result the object is transitioned to a Complex Data Object).  
A metaphorical example of an Indeterminate Data Object is again a piece of carbon paper, but one that 
had been used more extensively. In this case, even if it is not possible to extract individual documents 
based on current process, it would be irresponsible to produce because a new process could be created 
at some point in the future to extract the privilege-containing documents. 
It should be noted that Complex Data Object Processing is recursive in nature, as these objects may 
contain other Complex Data Objects.  Where no suitable methods are available for interpretation of 
Complex Data Objects, a degenerate, non-recursive invocation is completed and the object is labeled 
as indeterminate.  
3.4 Digital Redaction 
If there are no items to redact, then no privilege or complex/indeterminate items were located and the 
process is considered complete. Subsequently, the Work Copy used to initialize the current Digital 
Forensics Investigation and all Privilege Logs associated with that Work Copy are ready for 
submission to the opposing side.  If privileged material is located then Digital Redaction commences. 
Using an index of redactable items, portions of the Work Copy are copied to a separate media source 
and are tagged with identifying location information and a reason for redaction. This becomes the In 
Camera Copy. In most legal situations, this is the copy of information given to the judge.  
Concurrently, a Privilege Log is created that contains the identifying information and a reason for 
redacting for each item.  
A Redacted Production Copy is created by copying the Work Copy to a sterile media source using one 
of a variety of techniques to sanitize or remove each identified portion of the Work Copy based on the 
index of redactable items. The result of this step is the Redacted Production Copy. This copy should 
contain no privileged or complex/indeterminate information. Both the Redacted Production Copy and 
the privilege log are provided to the opposing council. 
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3.5 Redaction Tokens 
Redaction tokens are bit sequences that can be used to replace or stand for private data, complex data 
objects, or indeterminate data objects in the Redacted Forensic Copy.  As such, they provide a method 
to describe the Redaction process to the court and other examiners. Tokens can help confirm the 
integrity of the redaction process and provide an accessible layer of abstraction for layperson juries.  
Implementation requirements will vary depending on legal statutes and precedence, but redaction 
tokens have inherent advantages which vary based on the method of implementation:  
? Tokens create identifiers that bind redacted data objects to the Privilege Log. 
? Tokens can act as markers for interoperability with other programs, thus making redacted data 
segments recognizable to external tools. Forensics suites could recognize markers and skip data 
carving or sliding window analysis on what is token data/meta-data.  
? Tokens can provide a basic audit log, with the token encoding information about the examiner, 
case, etc.  
? Tokens can contain a digital signature of the examiner, providing repudiation and a chain of 
custody.  
? Tokens can include a one-way hash of the redacted object, to verify the integrity of the original 
object and In Camera copy. 
? Tokens can emulate the pre-redaction environment; all data besides the redaction information 
will appear to be intact. 
? Tokens mimic the paper redaction system courts are familiar with, providing an easier 
conceptual understanding of the processes. 
The actual bit sequences for redaction tokens may be generated in a variety of ways, depending on the 
purpose of the token. The token can serve as a method to represent redacted data, bind meta-
information, and provide accountability or any combination thereof.  The size of the smallest redacted 
object might also dictate the potential contents of the token, if the courts want to keep file sizes 
original. In UTF8, a common encoding format, a name that might be considered privileged could be as 
small as 6 bytes, thus becoming the maximum token size.  On the other hand, redaction of large image 
files increases the potential size of the token, potentially adding to its abilities.   
There are many considerations in generation of the token. Foremost, tokens for each production must 
be consistent in format, and agreed upon by all parties. Secondly, the token must be amenable to 
parsing. This issue is more complex than it might initially appear since good tokens must avoid magic 
numbers and other bit sequences used in file headers and file system constructs. Additionally, tokens 
should be easily identifiable and be generated in a reasonable amount of time. Lastly, it is vital that a 
token never reveal information about the contents of the data objects represented in the Redacted 
Production Copy. 
3.6 Reprocessing and Validation 
To provide assurance that redaction has been accomplished successfully, the Redacted Production 
Copy is re-processed through the described redaction process, as many times as necessary to provide 
reasonable certainty as to accuracy of the redaction. If additional privileged or complex/indeterminate 
information is found during subsequent examinations, the information is redacted and added to the In 
Camera Copy and Privilege Log. 
Additionally, the In Camera copy is subjected to the post-redaction validation process. This is a 
separate Electronic Device Investigation; if privilege and complex/indeterminate data rules have been 
properly applied during the Electronic Device Investigation, every item in the In Camera Copy should 
be marked for redaction. 
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4. CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
The increasing use of digital forensics in legal action is an indicator that digital redaction will soon be 
at the forefront of discussion. Current methods of redaction do not sufficiently address the complexity 
of the problem in the digital arena. It is only a matter of time before the legal community realizes this 
and reacts. 
Consider an attorney who is using digital forensics to find privileged information from free or slack 
space. It can be assumed that opposing counsel would never have turned this information over had 
they known it existed. This slip will give one side an unfair and unwarranted advantage in this case.  
Or more ominously, consider an individual engaged in criminal acts fighting a discovery order for 
digital media by insisting that the computer contains privileged communication between himself and 
counsel.  Since there is no clear path to redact this information, the entire data source must be declared 
off limits. 
Clearly, the time to address digital redaction concerns is now.  Future work must identify the best 
possible methods for digital redaction as they apply to the variety of storage solutions currently 
available. Because the technologies differ so widely it is assumed that, while the general methodology 
for each media type will be the same, implementation and execution will vary widely.  It seems 
apparent that the issues inherent in digital redaction are thorny enough to keep research in both the 
legal and computing communities busy for quite some time.  
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